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1. Introduction	  
 
Child marriage2 is on the decline, but it is still a widespread practice. It occurs in many different 
areas of the world, from Africa to the Asian subcontinent. It is a violation of human rights—
more specifically, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child—and it has very 
harmful consequences: (1) even when the marriage is not forced, young girls are often too 
immature to give their well-reasoned consent to the marriage (Gaffney-Rhys, 2011; Mikhail, 
2002); (2) by taking away childhood and the chance of an education, child marriage inhibits 
girls’ personal development and makes learning and practicing a profession extremely difficult 
(Amin, Diamond, Naved, & Newby, 1998; Mikhail, 2002); (3) girls risk sexual abuse and 
violence by their husbands (Raj, Saggurti, Lawrence, Balaiah, & Silverman, 2010); and (4) early 
pregnancies increase risks of disease and even death of mother or child (Mahavarkar, Madhu, & 
Mule, 2008; Raj, 2010; Raj & Boehmer 2013).  
With an eye to abandoning it, there has been much research on child marriage, both 
empirical and theoretical. Scholars have developed tools to measure different aspects of child 
marriage and to monitor and evaluate progress in ending child marriage, and they have 
developed theories about the origin and persistence of this practice. While there has been 
substantial progress in child marriage research, we believe that the existing research suffers from 
three problems. First, there are too many explanations of child marriage, and it is not clear how 
the different determinants identified by these explanations are supposed to fit together. Second, 
explanations of child marriage often lack theoretical rigor. Child marriage is referred to as 
“culture”, a “practice”, an “institution”, a “custom”, a “convention”, a “social norm”, or a 
“moral” imperative, but there is no theory behind it.3 Related to this is the third problem: There 
                                                
2 Child marriage is a marriage in which at least one of the spouses is less than 18 years old. In most of the cases, it is 
the girl who is still a child. Child marriage is also more problematic for girls. Therefore, we focus on girls in this 
paper, although for simplicity we will still talk about child marriage. 
3 For instance, in their very interesting review of programs to end child marriage, Malhotra, Warner, McGonagle, & 
Lee-Rife (2011) write: “efforts … attempt to change underlying social norms that perpetuate the practice of child 
marriage” (p. 6, emphasis added); “parental education and community mobilization attempt to change social norms 
and forge a more supportive, less punitive environment for girls and families who are willing and ready to change 
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are many measurement tools available for Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) of progress in 
ending child marriage, but these instruments also lack rigorous theoretical backing.  
In this paper, we offer a general theoretical framework that can, first, help integrate the 
different explanations of child marriage and, second, guide the development of measurement 
tools indispensible for child marriage M&E. Our theoretical framework is based on insights into 
how individuals make decisions. The collective practice of child marriage is ultimately a cluster 
of individual behaviors, so that, if we want to understand it, we have to understand why 
individuals behave in certain ways. One important aspect of people’s behavior is that it is often 
influenced by what other people do and by what other people think should be done. When 
behavior is influenced in that manner, it is called a social norm (Bicchieri, 2006, 2014). We 
argue that a theoretical framework that incorporates a social norms perspective is a useful guide 
for child marriage M&E. 
In the second section, we introduce a simple model that explains the behaviors of 
individuals—including the behaviors that sustain the practice of child marriage—by the 
preferences they have, the options they have to choose from, and the beliefs they have about 
these options. In the third section, we argue that collective practices like child marriage can be 
sustained by two kinds of preferences, namely unconditional and conditional preferences, and 
two kinds of beliefs, namely nonsocial beliefs and social expectations. Measuring both 
unconditional preferences and conditional preferences and nonsocial and social expectations 
allows you to determine whether a collective practice is a social norm or not. In the fourth 
section, we discuss different types of practices (customs, moral rules, conventions, social norms, 
etc.), we show why it is crucial for designing interventions to understand what type of practice 
child marriage is, and we conclude that child marriage M&E has to elicit the preferences and 
beliefs that allow us to distinguish between these practices. We also show that collective 
practices can be sustained by false beliefs. Because informing people about the falsity of these 
beliefs can contribute to ending child marriage, we argue that it is important that child marriage 
                                                                                                                                                       
the custom of early marriage” (p. 13, emphasis added); and “child marriage prevention programs … aim to change 
deeply entrenched social and cultural practices” (p. 24, emphasis added). But what is the difference between a 
“practice”, a “custom”, and a “social norm”, and what does it mean for a practice to be “social” or “cultural”? 
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M&E includes measuring the things that make these beliefs false. The last section contains a 
conclusion. 
 2. A	  simple	  model:	  preferences,	  options	  and	  beliefs	  
 
Child marriage does not lack explanations. If anything, child marriage has too many 
explanations. Here is a list of explanations that have been given for the origin and persistence of 
child marriage (see for instance Jain & Kurz, 2007; Loaiza & Wong, 2012; UNICEF, 2001; 
Verma, Sinha, & Khanna, 2013):  
1. Conciliation: Marriages are primarily an instrument to bring families closer together 
rather than to make spouses happy. 
2. Why-Educate: Parents are too poor to pay for the girl’s upbringing, and marriage 
means one less mouth to feed. Moreover, there are no decent schools in the 
neighborhood, and there are no jobs for women.  
3. Dowry: Parents have to pay higher dowries or accept lower bride prices for older 
girls. Potential grooms, or their families, prefer young brides. 
4. Safeguard: If (good) grooms are scarce, it is best to marry whenever a (good) 
possibility arises. 
5. Chastity: Parents want their daughters to be chaste, and there is a risk that girls who 
grow older loose their virginity outside marriage, because they might have love 
affairs or they might be harassed. Here are some variants of the Chastity explanation: 
o Ignorance-about-Chastity: Parents overestimate the risk of love affairs (and 
harassment). 
o Chastity-Norm: Daughters are expected to be chaste, and the slightest 
suggestion of premarital sex would ruin the reputation of both daughter and 
parents.  
o Ignorance-about-Chastity-Norm: Parents overestimate the extent to which 
others expect them to have chaste daughters. 
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6. Conformity: All girls are getting married young. Here is a variant of the Conformity 
explanation: 
o Ignorance-about-Conformity: Parents overestimate the number of girls that 
are getting married young. 
7. Tradition: Child marriage is just a “custom”, a “tradition”, part of people’s “culture”. 
8. Housewife: People, girls included, believe girls should be good wives and mothers, 
and their well-being and personal development is less important.  
9. Ignorance-about-Harm: People underestimate the harm child marriage causes.  
10. Docility: Girls lack the capabilities to defend their own interests. 
11. Law: There are no laws forbidding child marriage or, if there are, they are not 
enforced. Here is a variant of the Law explanation: 
o Ignorance-about-Law: The laws forbidding child marriage are not known. 
12. Juliet: Children themselves desire love and marriage. 
This is a long list of explanations. This explanatory abundance, however, does not by 
itself imply that the child marriage literature is confused and inconsistent. Different explanations 
may apply to different regions and to different times. Moreover, child marriage in one specific 
region at one specific time can have multiple correct explanations, because there are many 
factors that influence it. The items listed are thus better interpreted as partial explanations rather 
than grand, encompassing theories of child marriage. However, we still need an encompassing 
theory to develop a systematic approach to monitoring change in child marriage. But the theory 
needs to be sufficiently general so that it can include all the partial explanations listed. 
To build such a general theoretical framework, let us start with a simple economic model 
of behavior and gradually add complications. According to economists, people behave in a 
certain way because they maximally satisfy their preferences given their limited options. For 
instance, the Why-Educate explanation—that further educating girls is costly and not useful 
given the lack of schools and jobs—assumes that parents prefer to have as much food, clothes 
and other goods as possible, but that their options are limited because the money they have and 
the opportunities to earn money are limited. Since there are no schools and no jobs for women, 
educating one’s daughter will not bring in money. The Dowry explanation fits the preference-
satisfaction-given-limited-options mold too. To understand people’s behavior we thus need to 
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understand both people’s preferences and the options they have when trying to satisfy these 
preferences. 
Now, the preferences of parents are of course not purely self-regarding, as many 
economists would have it. Parents also care about their daughters: They want them to find a good 
husband, to be good wives, to have children, to be happy, etc. They want that for their daughters, 
not necessarily because they will get something from it. In other words, parents have other-
regarding preferences: preferences about the well-being of others rather than their own well-
being. Other-regarding preferences also play a role in explaining child marriage. According to 
the Safeguard explanation, if grooms are scarce and parents want their daughters to enjoy the 
bliss of marriage, they will marry them off when the opportunity arises. This means that parents 
maximally satisfy other-regarding preferences given the limited marriage options they have. 
Likewise, if the slightest suggestion of premarital sex would ruin the reputation of one’s 
daughter and thus the chance for her to ever get married, it is in her own interest to be married 
off early, and some parents do so for the sake of their daughters—this is a variant of the 
Chastity-Norm explanation. Since preferences—self-regarding and other-regarding—play an 
important role in explaining the behavior of the parents, child marriage M&E must carefully 
elicit these preferences. 
If parents care about the well-being of their daughters, you might wonder, why don’t they 
take into account the immense harm child marriage may cause? Of course, parents need to make 
trade-offs: They don’t want their daughters to be harmed, but they also want a marriage for them, 
and they want food on the table, etc. The fact that early marriage has harmful consequences 
limits the options parents have: They cannot have both an early marriage and avoid harm. Hence, 
they cannot satisfy all their preferences. However, there might be more to it. According to the 
Ignorance-about-Harm explanation, parents might be making the wrong trade-off because they 
underestimate the harm child marriage causes. In other words, parents’ beliefs about the options 
are false. Since they do not know about the harmful consequences, they might think they have 
the option of a harmless child marriage.  This complicates matters a bit, but not too much: To 
understand people’s behavior, we need to understand not only (1) people’s preferences and (2) 
the options they have in trying to satisfy these preferences, but also (3) the false beliefs they hold 
about their options (see Table 1). To change a practice like child marriage, you have to change 
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preferences, options or beliefs. For monitoring and evaluating change in child marriage, you 
have to measure (changes in) preferences, options and beliefs. 
 
 Definition Examples 
Preferences Somebody’s ranking of all possible 
options according to their desirability.  
Preferring more money to less; 
preferring a happy child to an unhappy 
child. 
Options The set of available courses of action 
(with their implications) somebody 
can actually choose from. People’s 
options are limited. 
Sending girls to school or trying to get 
them a job might not be options. 
Beliefs about 
options 
The beliefs somebody holds about the 
set of available courses of action or 
their implications. 
The belief that girls have love affairs, 
and thus that delaying marriage while 
preserving virginity is not an option. 
Table 1. The definitions of what preferences, options and beliefs about options are, with examples. 	  3. Different	  kinds	  of	  beliefs	  and	  preferences:	  the	  importance	  for	  social	  norms	  
 
The Chastity explanation is ambiguous in several ways. When talking about other-regarding 
preferences, we interpreted the Chastity explanation as saying that parents marry off their 
daughter early because they care about her well-being and are afraid that if she does not get 
married early, she might have love affairs and ruin her chance of a decent marriage. However, 
there are other versions of the Chastity explanation. Parents might not really think about their 
daughters’ well-being, but they might just think it would be morally bad for the daughter to have 
premarital sex. They might have a moral preference for chaste women, be it their own daughter 
or any other woman. This moral preference is based on the belief that women should be chaste. 
The latter is a normative belief, namely a belief about what should be done—and what should not 
be done. 
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 It might get even more complicated. Perhaps parents marry off their daughters early, not 
because parents believe that daughters should be chaste, but because parents believe that others 
believe daughters should be chaste, and parents do not want to go against the normative beliefs 
of others. Beliefs about what others think should be done are called normative expectations 
(Bicchieri, 2006), in contrast with beliefs about what should be done, which we can then call 
personal normative beliefs, since they are personal opinions.4 While personal normative beliefs 
are first-order beliefs, normative expectations include second-order beliefs: beliefs about what 
other people believe, that is, “beliefs about beliefs” (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 15; 2014, Ch.1). More 
specifically, normative expectations include expectations about other people’s normative 
personal beliefs. 
But there is more to normative expectations than beliefs about other people’s normative 
beliefs. Let us return to child marriage. Parents might have normative expectations of all sorts. 
They might just think others would disapprove of delaying marriage, because of the chastity 
issue. But parents might also expect others to punish them in all sorts of way, by gossiping about 
them, by socially excluding them, etc. Expectations of punishment are also normative 
expectations and they have an obvious impact on people’s behavior.  
People rarely care only about what others think should be done: They also care about 
what other people do (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). When deciding when to marry off their 
daughters, parents will be influenced by when other parents are marrying off their daughters. 
Beliefs about the behavior of other people are called empirical expectations (Bicchieri, 2006). 
Think of it like this: That others behave in a certain way is something “empirical”; that others 
believe one should behave in a certain is something “normative”. Empirical and normative 
expectations are both beliefs about others; we call these beliefs about others social expectations.  
The personal belief that one should behave in a certain way is not a belief about other 
people—not a “social” belief. The same can be said about the (false) beliefs about the harmful 
consequences of early marriage. We call the latter factual beliefs, in contrast with both personal 
normative beliefs and social expectations.5 Like personal normative beliefs, factual beliefs are 
                                                
4 Note that in this context the terms “beliefs” and “expectations” are synonymous. 
5 In our terminology, factual beliefs are beliefs about “facts” or “things”, rather than about people and values. Note 
that factual beliefs in this sense can still be factually wrong though (see later). Note also that we do not call 
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“nonsocial”; like empirical expectations, factual beliefs are “non-normative”. The table below 
summarizes what we just said and illustrates the two dimensions according to which we can 
categorize beliefs: their being social or not, and their being normative or not. 
 
 Nonsocial beliefs Social beliefs/expectations 
Non-normative beliefs Factual beliefs Empirical expectations 
Normative beliefs Personal normative beliefs Normative expectations 
Table 2. Classification of beliefs according to their being social or not, and their being normative or not. 
 
 Definition Examples 
Factual beliefs 
Beliefs about reality other 
than about people’s 
behavior and thought 
An older girl will not find a good husband. 
Personal 
normative beliefs 
Beliefs about what one 
should do 
I should marry my daughter as soon as she 
reaches puberty. 
Empirical 
expectations 
Beliefs about what people 
do 
All my neighbors marry their daughters as 
soon as they reach puberty. 
Normative 
expectations 
Beliefs about what other 
people think one should do 
My neighbors think that one should marry 
one’s daughter as soon as she reaches 
puberty. 
Table 3. Different kinds of beliefs, with examples. 
 
We will see later that, for designing programs to end harmful practices, the most 
important distinction is that between nonsocial beliefs and social expectations. We call people’s 
preferences that are conditional on social expectations conditional preferences, in contrast with 
unconditional preferences like self-regarding, other-regarding and moral preferences. The latter 
                                                                                                                                                       
empirical expectations “factual” beliefs, even though empirical expectations are beliefs about people’s behaviors 
and people’s behaviors are also facts. 
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are not conditional on others doing or thinking the same as you do. The concepts of conditional 
preferences and social expectations allow us to clearly define what a social norm is. Briefly, a 
social norm is a collective practice sustained by empirical and normative expectations and by 
preferences conditional on both these expectations (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 11).  
This definition should be further specified in the following ways. First, not all social 
expectations matter for social norms. When a father’s preferences about his daughter’s marriage 
are conditional on his expectations about what others do and think, he does not care about what 
people do and think in other countries or far away villages. He will care about what certain 
people do or think, namely those belonging to his reference group. The reference group of the 
father in our example might include other fathers in his village, or the village elders, perhaps also 
the women. Who exactly belongs to people’s reference group is an empirical issue, and we will 
say more on mapping reference groups later. Second, it will rarely be the case that everybody in 
one’s reference group will behave and think in the same way. But it is enough that many people 
do or think in a certain way for people to be influenced. Exactly how much conformity is 
necessary to influence one’s behavior is again an empirical issue, but it is easy to think of social 
norms as being based on expectations about at least the majority. Finally, strictly speaking, the 
term “social norm” refers not to people’s behavior but to the rule to behave in a certain way. The 
following diagram summarizes what has been said. 
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Figure 1. The definition of a social norm. Source: Bicchieri (2012). 
 
Not everybody’s preferences are conditional on their social expectations and not 
everybody is equally sensitive to social expectations. Sensitivity to social expectations is often 
due to a lack of agency or autonomy. Autonomy is the ability and desire to make one’s own 
choices, to choose what one really wants, and to reflect on what one might want (Bavetta & 
Navarra, 2012, Ch. 3; Chirkov, Ryan, & Sheldon, 2011), rather than having others make choices 
for you and decide for you what you want. In short, autonomy is self-determination or personal 
freedom. Not all people are equally autonomous. Hence, many child marriage programs aim at 
empowering women (e.g., Sood, Shuaib, & Nambiar, 2007)—at increasing their level of 
autonomy—so that they can abandon harmful social norms and perhaps even take the lead in the 
collective process of change. Hence, autonomy too should be measured in child marriage M&E. 
The importance of social expectations to the existence of norms indicates that behaviors 
as well as beliefs are interrelated. To understand certain parents’ decision to marry off their 
daughter early, you have to know what other parents are doing and thinking. Now, parents are 
not the only actors that sustain child marriage. In fact, child marriage is sustained by many 
behaviors performed by many actors, as is illustrated in the diagram below. Monitoring progress 
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in ending child marriage thus requires monitoring the preferences, options and beliefs of all these 
different actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Different people (“actors”) doing different things (“behaviors”) that have an impact on child 
marriage (the “practice”). The actors in red constitute the reference group of the parents. 
 4. Different	  kinds	  of	  practices,	  and	  false	  beliefs	  
 
Scholars sometimes conclude too quickly from the fact that a practice is widespread that it must 
be a “social norm”. However, not all collective practices are social norms, as our discussion of 
the different explanations of child marriage should have illustrated. By merely observing a 
collective practice like child marriage, we do not know what is the nature of the practice, because 
we do not know why people endorse it.  
First, as the Why-Education and Dowry explanations illustrate, the practice of child 
marriage could be sustained by self-regarding or other-regarding preferences, in which case we 
would call it a rational response. For instance, all parents might be just calculating that it would 
cost too much money to keep their daughters at home. If all parents think like that, you can 
Girl	   Groom	  
Parents	   Parents	  
Community	  leaders	  
Family/	  friends	  
Government	  ofEicials	  
People	  of	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consent	  
arrange	  
arrange	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(not)	  enforce	  law	  
force	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influence	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bride	  price	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  dowry	  
arrange	  
gossip	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observe a homogenous collective practice that is the result of each individual calculating what 
best fulfills his or her interest. 
Second, child marriage might be just something that is done in certain communities. The 
reason for it might have been long forgotten, but people still do it because that is what they have 
been taught. In that case, we would call child marriage a custom.  
Third, child marriage could also be sustained by moral preferences, based on personal 
normative beliefs, which would make it a moral rule. If child marriage is due to parents holding 
the normative personal belief that women should be chaste, it is a moral rule; if child marriage is 
due to parents having the normative expectation that others hold that women should be chaste, it 
is a social norm. 
Finally, even if child marriage would depend on social expectations, it is still possible 
that it is not a social norm, because it is at least theoretically possible that it would depend on 
empirical expectations only. Practices that depend on empirical expectations only are called 
descriptive norms (Bicchieri, 2006, 2014). Driving on the right side of the road is an example of 
a descriptive norm or, more specifically, a convention. Americans prefer to drive on the right 
side on the road because they expect most other people to do the same—an empirical 
expectation. If most others would drive on the left side, people would also prefer to drive on the 
left. Driving on the right side of the road is not a social norm because people’s driving on the 
right side is not conditional on their normative expectation that others believe they should drive 
on the right side. People might in fact expect that others think that one should drive on the right 
side, but they would still drive on the right side even if they did not expect others to care: They 
drive on the right side because they have an empirical expectation that others do so as well, and 
this is a sufficient motivation, since they do not want to crash into people. Child marriage is 
probably not a convention like driving on the right side of the road. There are conventional 
aspects to child marriage: The parents of girls have to coordinate with the parents of boys (or 
with men) on when to marry. But there clearly are normative aspects too—think of the chastity 
norm: normative expectations matter too. 
The following diagram summarizes what has been said: It clearly shows how we can 
categorize different kinds of practices based on the different kinds of preferences and beliefs that 
sustain them. 
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Figure 3. Categorization of collective practices based on preferences and beliefs. Adapted from Bicchieri 
(2012). 
 
 Definition Examples 
Rational 
response 
A rule that people follow because 
they reason it maximally satisfies 
their preferences 
Fathers marry off their daughters young 
because girls are a financial burden 
Custom A rule that people follow more or 
less blindly but which would be 
abandoned if no longer in their own 
interest 
Fathers just marry off their daughters 
young because it is a tradition and nobody 
thinks much about it. 
Moral rule A rule that people follow because 
they believe that it should be 
followed (personal normative belief) 
Fathers believe that girls should marry 
young because girls should be pure and 
chaste. 
Descriptive A rule that people follow because Fathers marry off their daughters young 
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unconditional	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norm they believe that others follow it 
(empirical expectation) 
because they believe other fathers also 
marry off their daughters young. 
Social 
norm 
A rule that people follow because 
they believe that others follow it 
(empirical expectation) and that 
others think it should be followed 
(normative expectation) 
Fathers marry off their daughters young 
because they believe other fathers also 
marry off their daughters young and, 
moreover, they believe other fathers think 
that girls should marry young (because 
girls should be pure and chaste). 
Table 4. Different kinds of collective practices, with examples. 
 
Although the reader might feel overwhelmed by the scholarly distinctions we introduced, 
it is of great practical importance to know whether child marriage is a rational response, a 
custom, a moral rule, a descriptive norm or a social norm. If child marriage is a rational 
response, the incentives need to be changed—as economists know very well. If child marriage is 
a custom, it is fairly easily abandoned: If people realize that the reason why a certain custom was 
once established no longer holds at present, they will abandon it.  
If child marriage is a descriptive norm or a social norm, however, things are more 
complicated. Then people’s preference to engage in it depends on social expectations. Since 
people’s behavior depends on what others do and think, they will not change their behavior 
unless others do so as well. This might sound as if they are trapped, since nobody will ever want 
to be the first one to change behavior and hence change is impossible. However, change can 
occur, but it must occur collectively, in a coordinated way (Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014; Mackie, 
1996). If everybody changes at the same time, change is possible while conditional preferences 
are satisfied. Hence, the entire reference group needs to participate in the change. You cannot 
adopt a piecemeal approach, starting with a few individuals and hoping to expand gradually.  
Moreover, if a practice is a social norm rather than a descriptive norm, normative 
expectations will matter. To change a social norm, it is important to change normative 
expectations. In the case of child marriage, this might mean that one has to change not only 
people’s personal normative beliefs that child marriage is good but also their normative 
expectations that others think that child marriage is good.  
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Finally, whatever kind of practice child marriage is, it is possible that it is based on false 
beliefs, which opens new routes for intervention. Note that preferences cannot be false. As the 
Latin saying goes: De gustibus non est disputandum—there is no disputing about tastes. But you 
can dispute beliefs.6 From an M&E point of view, this means that it is important to measure not 
only beliefs but also the things that prove these beliefs right or wrong.  
All sorts of beliefs related to child marriage could be false. People’s factual beliefs may 
be false. For instance, a father’s belief that an unmarried girl’s integrity and purity is doomed to 
be damaged may be false. A father may also falsely believe that the law permits child marriage. 
Similarly, people’s social expectations can be false. First, their empirical expectations can 
be false: A father might falsely believe that almost everybody marries off his or her daughters 
young; this father might seriously underestimate the number of later marriages. Second, people’s 
normative expectations can be false: A father might overestimate the number of people who 
believe that chastity is so important that one should marry of one’s daughter young. The case of a 
social norm sustained by normative expectations that are actually false is a very odd one. In the 
very extreme case, everybody thinks that others endorse the practice but, in fact, nobody does: 
There is total discordance between people’s normative expectations and their personal normative 
beliefs. Because everybody thinks he or she is the only one who privately does not endorse the 
practice, everybody will publicly claim to endorse the practice, hence reinforcing the social 
norm. The situation in which a norm persists because many people are ignorant about other 
people’s true beliefs is called pluralistic ignorance. 
That collective practices, be it norms or rational responses, can be based on false beliefs 
is important for interventions. If any of the factual beliefs people hold are false, the possibility to 
inform them about the truth is a powerful tool, although there is often a problem of how to do 
this credibly. Similarly, if social expectations are incorrect, you have a powerful tool to change 
the practice: You can inform people about how wrong their social expectations are.  
 
                                                
6 It may be difficult to say of personal normative beliefs that they are wrong, because these beliefs do not refer to 
concrete facts or concrete people that we can at least in principle observe. Factual beliefs and social expectations, 
however, can clearly be false. 
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5. Conclusion	  
 
In this paper, we constructed a theoretical framework that can guide Monitoring & Evaluation 
(M&E) of progress in ending child marriage. M&E is difficult because there are so many 
explanations of child marriage. However, we have shown how a general framework can be built 
on the basis of a simple model that explains the behavior of individuals in terms of the 
preferences they have, the options they face and the beliefs about these options they hold. We 
have gradually complicated this model by introducing different kinds of beliefs—nonsocial and 
social—and different kinds of preferences—unconditional and conditional. Child marriage has 
proven difficult to curb, and one of the reasons is undoubtedly the fact that it is sustained by 
conditional preferences: preferences conditional on expectations about other people’s behaviors 
and thoughts. In other words, people care about what others do and think. When this is the case, 
we call the practice a social norm. Social norms require special interventions and, to monitor and 
evaluate these interventions, we need special measurement tools.  
Let us conclude by previewing our work on applying our theoretical framework to 
measurement from a social norms perspective. The simplest way to elicit people’s preferences 
and beliefs about their options is through surveys. Fortunately, two large-scale household survey 
programs provide us with a wealth of data on beliefs and preferences relevant to a number of 
practices that have an impact on people’s health and well-being, namely (1) USAID’s 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and (2) UNICEF’s own Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS). They also provide some data relevant to child marriage as a social norm. In 
addition to the DHS and MICS, smaller country-specific surveys have been conducted, usually 
as part of the M&E of a program to end child marriage (e.g., Maharjan, Karki, Shakya, & Aryal, 
2012; Sood et al., 2007). These smaller surveys provide data that is even more interesting from a 
social norms perspective. However, there are still gaps. Our theoretical framework serves exactly 
to fill these gaps. 
In the diagram below, we add some of the existing survey questions to the categorization 
shown earlier, and we also fill a gap left by these surveys. By doing that, we get a true 
diagnostics of collective practices: 
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Figure 4. Diagnostics for child marriage. Based on C. Bicchieri (2012). The green question is a MICS 
question, the blue questions are Sood et al. (2007)’s and Maharjan et al.’s (2012) and the orange question 
is our addition. 
“In	  what	  month	  and	  year	  did	  you	  marry	  or	  start	  living	  with	  a	  man	  as	  if	  married?”	  
Collective	  practice	  of	  child	  marriage	  
“Why	  does	  early/child	  marriage	  happen?"	  
Based	  on	  
unconditional	  
preferences	  for	  child	  marriage	  
“What	  are	  the	  positive	  effects	  …	  of	  child	  marriage?"	  	  
Rooted	  in	  self-­‐
interest	  
Child	  marriage	  is	  
rational	  behavior	  or	  a	  custom	  
“Do	  you	  think	  child	  marriage	  should	  be	  continued	  or	  should	  it	  be	  stopped?”	  
Rooted	  in	  personal	  
normative	  belief	  about	  child	  marriage	  
Child	  marriage	  is	  a	  
moral	  rule	  
Based	  on	  conditional	  
preferences	  for	  child	  marriage	  
“Approximately,	  how	  many	  girls	  are	  married	  early	  in	  your	  community?”	  
Conditional	  on	  
empirical	  
expectations	  aboutt	  child	  marriages	  
Child	  marriage	  is	  a	  
descriptive	  norm	  
"Are	  people	  in	  your	  area	  in	  favor	  of	  child	  marriage?"	  
Conditional	  also	  on	  
normative	  
expectations	  concenringchild	  marriage	  
Child	  marriage	  is	  a	  
social	  norm	  
 
 
19 
 
 Obviously, these are merely the bare bones of a diagnostics that has to be much more 
elaborate. A more elaborate diagnostics requires a more thorough analysis of existing surveys on 
child marriage from a social norms perspective. Our theoretical framework can serve to indicate 
gaps in the surveys and to offer suggestions on how to fill them. Finally, because child marriage 
is a sensitive issue, the reliability of surveys is often a problem and we need to think of ways to 
improve it. We also have to consider alternatives to surveys, like laboratory and field 
experiments. These are all issues we are working on. It is our strong conviction that theory 
should guide measurement, and that measurement should guide policy. In that way, the social 
norms perspective can make a difference for child marriage. 
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